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Abstract

The highly publicized safeguard measures applied by the United States to an array of steel
products in 2002 became one of the biggest and the most controversial trade disputes in recent
history. Virtually all major trading nations in the world, including European Communities,
Japan, China, Brazil, Korea, New Zealand, Switzerland and Norway were the direct parties to
this dispute with the United States. The contentious legal grounds of the U.S. safeguard
measures as well as the lack of adequate consultations between the United States and its
trading counterparts have brought the international community close to a full-scale trade war.
This paper considers the important legal issues debated in U.S. Steel Safeguards and discusses
how the multilateral framework in the international trading system affected resolution of this
case.

It also draws lessons for the future application of trade measures such as safeguards

under the multilateral framework of international trading system.
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I.

INTRODUCTION1

A multilateral trading system, as currently represented by the World Trade Organization
(“WTO”), operates based on mutually agreed concessions among trading nations, and its
success would depend on their observance of those trade concessions previously negotiated
and agreed upon among the members of the WTO system (“Members”).2 The GATT/WTO
rules under certain conditions authorize trade measures that restrict imports unilaterally

1

Safeguard measures in international trade have received a growing academic attention in
recent years. The author has published several articles and books on various issues of
safeguard measures in international trade as the following:
Reflections on the Agreement on Safeguards in the WTO 21(6) WORLD COMPETITION 25-31
(co-authored with Jai S. Mah) (1998); Review of the First WTO Panel Case on the Agreement
on Safeguards: Korea – Definitive Safeguard Measure on Imports of Certain Dairy Products
and Its Implications for the Application of the Agreement 33(6) JOURNAL OF WORLD TRADE
27-46 (1999); Emergency Safeguard Measures under Article X in GATS – Applicability of the
Concepts in the WTO Agreement on Safeguards 33(4) JOURNAL OF WORLD TRADE 47-59
(1999); The WTO Agreement on Safeguards: Improvement on the GATT Article XIX?, 14(3)
International Trade Journal 284-298 (2000); Critical Issues in the Application of the WTO
Rules on Safeguards – In the Light of the Recent Panel Reports and the Appellate Body
Decisions, 34 JOURNAL OF WORLD TRADE 131-147 (2000); Destabilization of the Discipline on
Safeguards? – Inherent Problems with the Continuing Application of Article XIX after the
settlement of the Agreement on Safeguards 35 JOURNAL OF WORLD TRADE 1235-1246 (2001);
Revival of Gray-Area Measures? - The U.S.-Canada Softwood Lumber Agreement: Conflict
with the WTO Agreement on Safeguards, 36 JOURNAL OF WORLD TRADE 155-166 (2002);
Specific Safeguard Mechanism in the Protocol on China’s Accession to the WTO – A Serious
Step Backward from the Achievement of the Uruguay Round 5 JOURNAL OF WORLD
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 219-231 (2002); Safeguard Measures: Why Are They Not Applied
Consistently with the Rules? - Lessons for Competent National Authorities and Proposal for
the Modification of the Rules on Safeguards, 36 JOURNAL OF WORLD TRADE 641-673 (2002);
SAFEGUARD MEASURES IN WORLD TRADE: THE LEGAL ANALYSIS (first edition 2003; second
edition, forthcoming, 2004); The Agreement on Safeguards, THE KLUWER GUIDE TO THE
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION (forthcoming, 2004).
2
Article II of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”) provides the Schedule of
Concessions of Members, which sets the maximum tariff rates for each product classification.
As the result of a series of multilateral trade negotiations, tariff rates for most non-primary
products have been substantially reduced. The average tariff rate on non-primary products of
industrial countries has been dropped to mere 3.9 percent after the Uruguay Round
negotiations. JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM (1997), at 74.
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beyond the bounds of those agreed concessions.3

The problem with unilateral import

restrictions such as safeguard measures (of “safeguards”)4 is that such restrictions upset the
balance of concessions previously negotiated between the importing and exporting Members.5
Maintaining balance of these concessions constitutes the core of the multilateral framework of
the current international trading system. The publicized safeguard measures recently applied
by the United States to its imports of steel products (“U.S. Steel Safeguards”)6 have
demonstrated how unilateral trade measures, motivated by internal politics without strong legal
justifications under the GATT/WTO rules, may affect this multilateral framework and
potentially lead to the destabilization of the trading system.

On March 20, 2002, in response to the repeated requests from the ailing U.S. steel industry, the
Bush Administration finally applied controversial safeguard measures.7
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These measures

So-called administered protection, such as antidumping measures, countervailing measure,
and safeguard measures are the examples of those trade measures. The GATT/WTO rules,
reprinted in WTO, THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE
NEGOTIATIONS: THE LEGAL TEXT (1994), set the conditions for the trade measures.
4
Safeguard measures are an emergency import restraint that is applicable where increased
imports cause or threaten to cause serious injury to a domestic industry. The WTO Agreement
on Safeguards as well as Article XIX of the GATT provides the rules on safeguards. See
WTO, THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS: THE
LEGAL TEXT, supra note 2, at 315-324, 518-519.
5
Antidumping measures and countervailing measures are considered distinguished from
safeguards, as those measures attempt to remedy injury caused by unfair trade practices such
as dumping and illegal subsidy and therefore are not considered disrupting the balance of
concessions among the exporting and importing countries.
6
United States – Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Certain Steel Products
(“United States – Steel Safeguards” or “U.S. Steel Safeguards”), WT/DS248~DS259/R
(Report of the Panel, dated July 11, 2003), WT/DS248~DS259/AB/R (Report of the Appellate
Body, dated November 10, 2003).
7
These measures were announced in the Proclamation 7529 of March 5, 2002 - To Facilitate
Positive Adjustment to Competition from Imports of Certain Steel Products (“Proclamation”)
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comprised of tariff increases up to thirty percent ad valorem as well as a tariff-quota, to its
imports of a range of steel products.8 These measures are among the most controversial and
significant trade measures in its implications on world trade.

It was the first safeguard

measures applied by a major economy against one of the most traded products in the world,
affecting as much as 1.31 billion tons of steel trade per year. Since the beginning of the World
Trade Organization (“WTO”) in 1995 has no other trade measure ever provoked a more
intense criticism and extensive resistance throughout the world.9

The U.S. steel safeguards

were indeed perceived as a major protectionist attempt by the United States to serve its
political interests without clear legal justifications under the GATT/WTO rules.10

The response of various steel-exporting Members to the U.S. steel safeguards was swift and
resolute. Only within two days after the U.S. announcement of the Steel Safeguards, the
European Communities (“EC”) filed a complaint with the WTO Dispute Settlement Body
(“DSB”), already preparing a list of U.S. products subject to its retaliation. Several other
Members including Japan, South Korea, Switzerland, Venezuela, Norway and China also
formally joined the EC in this dispute shortly afterwards.

The effect of the U.S. Steel

and the Memorandum of March 5, 2002 - Action Under Section 203 of the Trade Act of 1974
Concerning Certain Steel Products by the President of the U.S. (“Memorandum”), Federal
Register Vol. 67, No. 45 (Mar. 7 2002).
8
The products subject to the U.S. safeguard measures included slabs, flat steel, hot-rolled bar,
cold-finished bar, rebar, certain welded tubular products, carbon and alloy fittings, stainless
steel bar, stainless steel rod, tin mill products and stainless steel wire. Id.
9
The U.S. steel safeguard measures attracted significant public attention worldwide, making
headlines all over the world and invited strong objections from dozens of governments from
Brasilia to London and from Seoul to Sidney.
10
The political reasons behind the application of these U.S. safeguards as well as their
inconsistencies with the relevant GATT/WTO rules legal problems are discussed infra.
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Safeguards seem to have gone even beyond the membership of the WTO, and it also seems to
have affected Russia’s decision to ban imports of poultry from the United States.11 The
subsequent consultations between the United States and the steel exporting countries have not
produced any settlement on this dispute, and the WTO dispute settlement panel (“panel”) was
established to review the U.S. measures and determine their consistency with the GATT/WTO
rules.12

Why did the United States apply such controversial safeguard measures despite the worldwide
criticism and resistance? What was the political cause for those extraordinary measures and
what were the legal issues in the application of those measures? Safeguard measures are
applied as import restrictions where increased imports cause or threaten to cause serious injury
to a domestic industry.13 Safeguard measures are intended to assist Members to deal with the
acute, short-term problems associated with the rapid increase in imports such as massive
unemployment, by authorizing temporary import restraints until their domestic industry adjusts
to the import competition.

Political considerations are an important factor in applying a

11

According to the media report, this decision came two days after Russian steel producers
requested the government to block U.S. chicken imports, worth about $660 million last year, if
the Bush administration imposed sanctions on Russian steel. LOS ANGELES TIME, March 2,
2002.
12
The U.S. Steel Safeguards is the considered the largest WTO panel case to date with most of
the major economies in the world including the United States, European Communities, China,
Japan, Brazil, Switzerland and New Zealand as the direct parties to the case.
13
Article 2.1 of the Agreement on Safeguards, reprinted in WTO, THE RESULTS OF THE
URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS: THE LEGAL TEXT, supra note 2,
at 315. The author’s treatise on safeguards, SAFEGUARD MEASURES IN WORLD TRADE: THE
LEGAL ANALYSIS (2003), supra note 1, also offers a detailed account of the conditions for the
application of a safeguard measure.
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safeguard measure14. Nonetheless, the measures will be justified as long as they are consistent
with the requirement of the GATT/WTO rules on safeguards. The next section provides a
discussion of the background and development of U.S. Steel Safeguards. Then, the remainder
of this paper addresses those legal issues raised in the application of the U.S. Steel Safeguards,
considers how the multilateral framework of the current international trading system operated
to resolve the dispute and attempts to draw lessons for the future application of trade measures
such as safeguards.

II.

BACKGROUND AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE U.S. STEEL SAFEGUARDS15

1.

The State of the U.S. Steel Industry

The U.S. steel industry, which once symbolized the might of the U.S. industrial power, has been
considered an industry in crisis. During the latter half of the 20th century, the U.S. steel industry
lost its competitive edge against foreign steel producers who employed advanced production
technologies and better facilities.16 The U.S. steel producers, having enjoyed the dominence in
the domestic market for a long time through oligopoly did not make necessary investments to
modernize their aging steel production facilities.17 As the result, the cost efficiency of U.S. steel
production fell significantly below that of its competitors by 1970s.18

14

Y.S. LEE, SAFEGUARD MEASURES IN WORLD TRADE: THE LEGAL ANALYSIS (2003), supra
note 1, chapter 1.3, at 10-14.
15
This section is developed based on the author’s own previous work, SAFEGUARD MEASURES
IN WORLD TRADE: THE LEGAL ANALYSIS, supra note 1, at 83-92.
16
WILLIAM H. BARRINGER AND KENNETH J. PIERCE, PAYING THE PRICE FOR BIG STEEL
(American Institute for International Steel, 2000), at 25-34.
17
Id.
18
The unit cost per metric ton of steel in the United States was lower than that in Japan in
1958 but became twice as high as that in Japan by 1976. Id. Chart I-1.
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Excessive labor costs also have been pointed out as another reason for the perceived inefficency
of the U.S. steel industry. By 1958, the U.S. steel industry had already faced the highest unit
labor costs in the world, which continued to increase throughout the latter half of the 20th
century, well exceeding the actual labor productivity.19 The outdated and inefficient production
facilities particularly at old and smaller mills, coupled with excessive labor costs, drove the
industry into the critical stages. By 2001, affected by the worldwide over-production capacity,
the steel price also dropped down to their lowest for twenty years.20 The U.S. steel producers
sustained significant losses, and no fewer than 18 U.S. steel companies filed for bankruptcy
between January 1998 and June 2001. This declining state of the U.S. steel industry resulted in
significant job losses, as many as 5,000 in average a year since 1990.21

The job losses and the downward pressure on prices were not unique in the U.S. steel industry
but prevalent throught the world due to the substantial increase in productivity and the resulting
over-capacity. Smaller mills became unprofitable and the economies of scale induced them to
merge into more sizable ones, which then led to the excess production capacity. The existence of
over-capacity, which was known to exceed as much as 20 percent22, caused a long-term
downward trend in prices and made the condition of the steel industry particularly vulnerable to
the demand fluctuations during general economic recessions.

19

Id., at 35 – 38.
“A tricky business,” Economist, June 28, 2001.
21
Id.
22
Id.
20
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Facing this crisis, the well-organized U.S. steel producers asked the government for assistance.
The U.S. government, affected by the significant political influence of the steel unions and
producers, offered extensive assistance including various measures of trade protection as well as
financial subsidies. Steel products have undoubtely been more protected by trade measures such
as numerous antidumping actions and countervailing duties than any other.23 In additon to the
trade protection, the U.S. government granted enormous finaical support to the steel industry in
tens of billions of dollars24, which also included pension bailouts, tax refunds, environmental
regulation exemption subsidies, “Buy America” requirements and emergency loan guarantee
schemes.25

The recent U.S. Steel Safeguards were considered yet another protection attempt in a long line
of protections offered to this troubled industry, which delayed, rather than accelerated, the
needed structural adjustment. The application of the U.S. safeguard measures was considered
particularly improper as safeguard measures are predicated on an increase in imports that

23

For instance, in 2002, the U.S. government applied about a half of the existing 264
antidumping actions to the imports of steel products, although steel accounts for only 2 percent
of total imports. In addition, as many as 35 countervailing measures were also applied to steel
products at the same time. United States International Trade Administration, Antidumping and
Countervailing Duty Statistics, Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Orders in effect as of
July 26, 2002. <http://ia.ita.doc.gov/stats>
24
A recent study revealed that the steel lobby had won at least $16 billion ($21.8 billion in
constant 1999 dollars) in federal subsidies for domestic steel makers from US taxpayers with
additional billions received from state and local governments. The steel industry also received
additional billions from state and local governments. BARRINGER AND PIERCE, PAYING THE
PRICE FOR BIG STEEL, supra note 16.
25
Id.
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causes or threatens to cause serious injury to the domestic industry, but the steel imports were
reported as declining in recent years in most categories.26 Many believed that the U.S. Steel
Safeguards were motivated primarily by the Bush Administration’s need for political support
from the steel union for the upcoming Congressional elections as well as from the
representatives of the steel producing regions for the Congressional bill giving the President
trade negotiating (“Fast-Track”) authority.27

2.

Development of U.S. Steel Safeguards

As mentioned above, U.S. Steel Safeguards faced strong and open oppositions from the major
trading partners of the United States.28 What was alarming during the initial stages of the
application of U.S. Steel Safeguards was that the United States seemed to have made little effort
to avoid trade disputes with its concerned trading partners through adequate consultations. The
Agreement on Safeguards (“Safeguards Agreement” or “SA”) requires a Member proposing to
apply a safeguard measure provide an adequate opportunity for prior consultations with those
Members having a substantial interest.29

The consultation is required with a view to

26

According to the U.S. Census Bureau, U.S. imports of steel products decreased substantially
from 34,433,707 metric tons in 2000 to 27,350,808 metric tons in 2001. U.S. Census Bureau,
U.S. Imports for Consumption of Steel Products, Exhibit 1: All Steel Products (released
February 21, 2002).
27
In fact, after the Congressional vote on the trade promotion authority legislation, the
Administration granted a large number of exemptions from the measures, which seems to
provide support for this view. These exemptions were criticized by U.S. steel producers and
unions. Bush Scales Back Tariffs on Steel, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23, 2002, at A1.
28
Canada and Mexico did not raise any objection against U.S. Steel Safeguards since their
steel exports were exempted from the safeguard list.
29
The Agreement on Safeguards, art. 12.3, supra note 13.
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exchanging views on the measure and reaching an understanding on ways to achieve the balance
of concessions to be upset by the application of the safeguard.30

As discussed below, the United States did not provide adequate consultation opportunities
sufficiently prior to its application of the steel safeguards. Nevertheless, major steel exporting
Members rushed to the consultations with the United States but failed to resolve the dispute
between them. The United States’ major trading partners including, EC, China, Korea, Japan,
New Zealand, Switzerland, Norway and Brazil requested an establishment of a panel to review
the consistency of U.S. Steel Safeguards with the GATT/WTO rules, and the panel was
subsequently established to review the biggest trade dispute in recent history.31 In addition,
several Members, including the EC, Japan, China, Switzerland and Norway also proposed
extensive retaliations against U.S. Steel Safeguards.32

The danger of a worldwide trade war, which could have been triggered by the application of a
series of retaliatory measures, was averted as the United States subsequently agreed to reduce a
number of steel products, as much as 25% in terms of tonnage, from its safeguards list,33 and in

30

Id. See Y.S. LEE, SAFEGUARD MEASURES IN WORLD TRADE, supra note 14, chapter 11.3 for
more discussions on this issue.
31
WTO docs WT/DS248/15, WT/DS249/9, WT/DS251/10, WT/DS252/8, WT/DS253/8,
WT/DS254/8, WT/DS258/12, WT/DS259/11 (August 12, 2002)
32
WTO docs G/SG/43 (May 15, 2002), G/SG/44 (May 21, 2002), G/SG/45 (May 21, 2002),
G/SG/46 (May 21, 2002), G/SG/47 (May 22, 2002)
33
WTO docs G/SG/N/10/USA/6/Suppl.7, G/SG/N/11/USA/5/Suppl.7 (September 17, 2002).
Despite the position of the U.S. government that the exclusion was based on the U.S.
consumer need and on the determination that the exclusion would not undermine the
effectiveness of the safeguard measure, it was widely considered that the purpose of the
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consideration of these U.S. concessions, the application of retaliatory measures were suspended.
The WTO panel subsequently found that U.S. Steel Safeguards were not consistent with the
relevant GATT/WTO rules.34 The United States appealed this panel decision, and the Appellate
Body largely upheld the panel decision albeit with some modifications35, which was
subsequently accepted by the United States. As the result, the proposed retaliatory measures
against the U.S. exports were never put into effect, and the United States ubsequently withdrew
the Steel Safeguards.36

While the U.S. concessions and final withdrawal of the Steel Safeguards prevented a direct trade
war, the controversial U.S. Steel Safeguards have also triggered protectionism in other countries.
Fearing possible diversion of steel products from the protected U.S. market, Members including
the EC, China and Hungary applied provisional safeguard measures againt their own steel
products while initiating investigations for definitive safeguard measures.37 The EC has made an
affirmative injury determination and also decided to apply a definitive safeguard measure on
imports of seven steel products.38 Hungary and China also applied their own safeguards.39

exclusion is to avoid serious trade conflict with the major trading partners of the United States.
Tariff Exemptions Expanded, WASHINGTON POST, August 23, 2002, at E02.
34
Report of the Panel, supra note 6. The author also expressed a view that U.S. Steel
Safeguards were inconsistent with the relevant GATT/WTO rules. Y.S. LEE, SAFEGUARD
MEASURES IN WORLD TRADE, supra note 14, at 166-168.
35
Report of the Appellate Body, supra note 6
36
WTO doc. G/SG/N/10/USA/6/Suppl.8 (December 12, 2003)
37
WTO docs G/SG/N/7/EEC/1 (April 2, 2002); G/SG/N/7/CHN/1 (May 23, 2002);
G/SG/N/7/HUN/1 (May 23, 2002)
38
Commission Regulation (EC) No 1694/2002 of September 27, 2002 imposing definitive
safeguard measures against imports of certain steel products. See also the EC notification to
the Committee on Safeguards, G/SG/N/8/EEC/1, G/SG/N/10/EEC/1 (September 11, 2002).
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Canada, whose steel exports were not subject to U.S. Steel Safeguards, also initiated an
investigation for the application of a safeguard measure and subsequently made a positive injury
determination.40 Several other Members, including Chile, the Czech Republic, Mexico, Poland,
and Bulgaria have followed their lead and also initiated investigations for safeguard measures
against steel products, creating the danger of the “worldwide steel protections”.

The worst scenario, which leads to a downward sprawl of “protections” one after another, were
clearly in sight. This dangerous sign of the worldwide protectionism, triggered by U.S. Steel
Safeguards, created a significant concern for preserving the multilateralism in the world trading
system for freer trade, which consists of the respect for mutual concessions and the multilateral
legal framework. Surely, the multilateralism in interntional trade will not be sustainable in an
environment where unilateral protectionism is rampant. Particularly, the successful application
of a safeguard measure in the absence of adequate legal justifications may tempt other trading
nations to do the same in order to protect their own domestic producers, in fact causing the
worldwide protectionism. Therefore, it is necessary to review the legal justifications for U.S.
Steel Safeguards under the WTO rules. The nest section does so with reference to the relevant
GATT/WTO rules, namely Article XIX of the GATT and the WTO Agreement on Safeguards41.

39

WTO docs G/SG/N/10/HUN/1 (April 7, 2003), G/SG/N/CHN/1 (November 5, 2002)
WTO docs G/SG/N/6/CAN/1 (April 2, 2002), G/SG/N/8/CAN/1 (July 19, 2002). However
Canada did not decide to apply the safeguard measure.
41
Supra note 4.
40
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III.

LEGAL ISSUES IN THE APPLICATION OF U.S. STEEL SAFEGUARDS

1.

Unforeseen Developments

Paragraph 1(a) of Article XIX of the GATT provides,
“If, as a result of unforeseen developments and of the effect of the obligations incurred
by a contracting party under this Agreement, including tariff concessions, any product
is being imported into the territory of that contracting party in such increased
quantities and under such conditions as to cause or threaten serious injury to domestic
producers in that territory of like or directly competitive products, the contracting party
shall be free, in respect of such product, and to extent and for such time as may be
necessary to prevent or remedy such injury, to suspend the obligation in whole or in
part or to withdraw or modify the concession.” (Emphasis added.)
The underlined “unforeseen developments” clause is not included in the subsequent
Agreement on Safeguards42, and a question rose as to whether this particular clause imposes
any substantive legal requirement on a Member applying a safeguard measure.43 In response

42

Article 2.1 of the Agreement on Safeguards, which lays out the general conditions for the
application of a safeguard measure, does not include this “unforeseen development clause”. It
provides,
“A Member may apply a safeguard measure to a product only if that Member has
determined that such product is being imported into its territory in such increased
quantities, absolute or relative to domestic production, and under such conditions as to
cause or threaten to cause serious injury to the domestic industry that produces like or
directly competitive products.” (Footnote omitted.)
43
This question was first raised in the WTO panel cases, Korea - Definitive Safeguard
Measure on the Imports of Certain Dairy Products (“Korea – Dairy Products”), WT/DS98/R,
(Report of the Panel, dated June 21, 1999), WT/DS98/AB/R, (Report of the Appellate Body,
dated December 14, 1999); Argentina - Safeguard Measure on the Imports of Footwear
(“Argentina – Footwear”), WT/DS121/R, (Report of the Panel, dated June 25, 1999),
WT/DS121/AB/R, (Report of the Appellate Body, dated 14, 1999). The following WTO
dispute cases also concern safeguard measures, which are referenced throughout this paper:
United States – Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Wheat Gluten From the
European Communities (“United States – Wheat Gluten”), WT/DS166/R, (Report of the Panel,
dated July 31, 2000), WT/DS166/AB/R, (Report of the Appellate Body, dated December 22,
2000); United States – Safeguard Measures on Imports of Fresh, Chilled or Frozen Lamb
Meat from New Zealand and Australia (“United States – Lamb Meat”), WT/DS177/R,
WT/DS178/R (Report of the Panel, dated December 21, 2000), WT/DS177/AB/R,
WT/DS178/AB/R (Report of the Appellate Body, dated May 1, 2001); United States –
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to this question, the Appellate Body of the WTO DSB (“Appellate Body”) ruled that a
Member applying a safeguard measure must demonstrate as a matte of fact the existence of
“unforeseen developments” that led to the increase in imports causing serious injury or its
threat to the domestic industry, in pursuant to paragraph 1(a) of Article XIX.44

There has been a controversy as to whether this “unforeseen developments” clause should be
considered imposing any legal requirement at all. In fact, the panels in Korea – Dairy
Products and Argentina – Footwear did not consider that the “unforeseen developments”
clause in Article XIX creates any legal obligation,45 and the justification of the Appellate Body

Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Steel Wire Rod and Circular Welded Carbon
Quality Line Pipe (“United States – Line Pipe”), WT/DS202/R (Report of the Panel, dated
October 29, 2001), WT/202/AB/R (Report of the Appellate Body, dated February 15, 2002);
Chile –Price Band System and Safeguard Measures relating to Certain Agricultural Products
(“Chile – Agricultural Products”), WT/DS207/R (Report of the Panel, dated May 3, 2002) (the
issues in the case relating to safeguards were not appealed); Argentina – Definitive Safeguard
Measure on Imports of Preserved Peaches (“Argentina – Preserved Peaches”), WT/DS238/R
(Report of the Panel, dated February 14, 2003) (the panel rulings not appealed); United States
– Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Certain Steel Products (“United States – Steel
Products”), WT/DS248~DS259/R (Report of the Panel, dated July 11, 2003),
WT/DS248~DS259/AB/R (Report of the Appellate Body, dated November 10, 2003).
44
Korea – Dairy Products, Report of the Appellate Body, supra note 43, para. 90, Argentina –
Footwear, Report of the Appellate Body, supra note 43, para. 97, United States – Lamb Meat,
Report of the Appellate Body, supra note 43, paras 72 and 73.
45
Korea – Dairy Products, Report of the Panel, supra note 43, para. 7.42, Argentina –
Footwear, Report of the Panel, supra note 43, para. 8.69. As discussed above, the Appellate
Body reversed those panel positions and ruled that the “unforeseen developments” clause does
create an affirmative legal obligation to prove the existence of “unforeseen developments”. Id.
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ruling on this issue has been questioned.46

Despite this controversy, the Appellate Body’s

position remained unchanged, and the subsequent panels also had followed this ruling.47

The complainants argued that the United States had failed to comply with this requirement to
demonstrate “unforeseen developments”.48 The United States disagreed and claimed that it
had identified the unforeseen developments and therefore complied with this requirement.49
The Panel considered this issue, following the standard of review previously affirmed by the
Appellate Body50 that “the Panel must examine whether the United States demonstrated in its
published report, through a reasoned and adequate explanation, that unforeseen developments
and the effects of tariff concessions resulted in increased imports causing or threatening to
cause serious injury to the relevant domestic producers.”51 (Footnote omitted.)

The United States argued that it identified the financial crises that engulfed Southeast Asia
(Asian crisis) and the former USSR (Russian crisis), the continued strength of the United

46

For the controversy about the “unforeseen developments” clause and the applicability of
Article XIX, see Y.S. Lee, SAFEGUARD MEASURES IN WORLD TRADE: THE LEGAL ANALYSIS,
supra note 1, at 101-107.
47
Pursuant to the Appellate Body ruling, the recent panel in Argentina – Preserved Peaches
recognized Members’ obligation to demonstrate “unforeseen developments”.
48
United States – Steel Products, Report of the Panel, supra note 43, para. 10.32.
49
Id., para. 10.33.
50
United States – Lamb Meat, Report of the Appellate Body, supra note 43, paras 103-106.
51
United States – Steel Products, Report of the Panel, supra note 43, para. 10.38. Citing also
the previous Appellate Body rulings, the Panel stated that it would also examine, in application
of its standard of review, whether the competent authorities "considered all the relevant facts
and had adequately explained how the facts supported the determinations that were made.”
(Footnote omitted.) Id. para. 10.39. The Appellate Body subsequently affirmed this Panel
approach. United States – Steel Products, Report of the Appellate Body, supra note 43, para.
279.
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States' market and persistent appreciation of the US dollar, and the confluence of all of these
events as unforeseen developments.52 The complainants considered that none of these events
constituted unforeseen developments nor did any combination of them.53 The issue was
further compounded by the fact that the original report of the United States International Trade
Commission (“USITC”)54, which included a discussion of the Asian and Russian crises, did
not specifically address the issue of “unforeseen developments”, and the Second
Supplementary Report was subsequently issued to address this issue.55 The complainants
argued that this supplementary report should be disregarded as it did not comprise the original
USITC report and was an ex port attempt to demonstrate the existence of “unforeseen
developments.”56

Article 3.1 of the SA provides in the relevant part, “…The competent authorities shall publish
a report setting forth their findings and reasoned conclusions reached on all pertinent issues
of fact and law.” (Emphasis added.) The strictly literal interpretation of this clause, “a report
setting forth…findings and reasoned conclusions reached on all pertinent issues of fact and
law” seems to indicate that the national authority must publish a comprehensive single report

52

United States – Steel Products, Report of the Panel, supra note 43, para. 10.40.
Id.
54
Steel, USITC Pub. No.3479 (December 2001).
55
Id., para. 10.47.
56
Id.
53
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basing its decision on a safeguard measure and that the multiple reports do not seem consistent
with this provision.57

With respect to the multiplicity of the investigation report, the Panel considered that the
national authority’s report may be produced in parts as long as they form a coherent and
integrated explanation providing satisfaction with the requirements of Article XIX and the
Agreement on Safeguards.58

With respect to the issue of “unforeseen developments”, the

Panel, citing the previous Appellate Body decision59, considered that the demonstration of the
unforeseen developments must be made prior to the application of a safeguard measure, and as
the Supplementary Report was published before the application of the U.S. steel safeguards, it
believed that the demonstration of the unforeseen developments attempted in the
Supplementary Report was not necessarily made in an untimely fashion60 although its
adequacy was a separate issue. The Panel, therefore, accepted the Supplementary Report as
part of the investigation report for its examination.

In assessing the USITC’s explanation of the unforeseen developments, the Panel first
considered its explanation of why they were unforeseen and then moved on to consider the
explanation of how the unforeseen developments resulted in increased imports.61
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For a further discussion of the adequacy of an investigation report, refer to Y.S. LEE,
SAFEGUARD MEASURES IN WORLD TRADE, supra note 1, at 144-145.
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United States – Lamb Meat, Report of the Appellate Body, supra note 43, para. 72.
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considerations were applied to each of the following four events and to the confluence of those
events as explained by the United States, namely, the Asian financial crisis which began 1997,
the Russian financial crisis, the strength of the U.S. market and the appreciation of U.S. dollar.

With respect to the Asian financial crisis, the Panel considered that the United States
demonstrated that this event was not foreseen as it took place well after the conclusion of the
Uruguay Round.62

As to the Russian financial crisis, the unforeseen developments, as

identified by the USITC, were the "unanticipated financial difficulties", which, in particular,
were the "intense financial disruptions and currency fluctuations" between 1996 and 1999,
resulting from the dissolution of the Soviet Union.63 The Panel accepted, arguendo, that there
may have been, between 1996 and 1999, unforeseen financial disruptions and currency
fluctuations linked to the USSR dissolution that were thus unforeseen at the conclusion of the
Uruguay Round.64

With respect to the strength of the U.S. market as well as the appreciation of U.S. dollars vis-àvis other foreign currencies attracting imports, the Panel was of the view that the USITC
considered neither of those factors a stand-alone “unforeseen developments” but considered
them along with the other alleged unforeseen developments and as part of a set of world events

62

The parties agreed that the point in time at which developments should have been
unforeseen is that of the completion of the Uruguay Round. Id., para. 10.74.
63
Id., para. 10.83.
64
Id. para. 10.85.
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which together constituted unforeseen developments.65 Therefore, the Panel did not consider
that it had to determine whether or not such factors could distinctively constitute unforeseen
developments.66 The Panel acknowledged that the confluence of those factors could also be
considered an unforeseen development within the context of Article XIX.67

In the second phase assessment of the unforeseen development issue (i.e. how the unforeseen
developments resulted in increased imports), the Panel, following the previous Appellate Body
position68, considered that the logical connection between the unforeseen developments and
the increased imports must be demonstrated.69 In the Panel’s review, the logical connection
was not made properly in the USITC Report. In the Panel’s view, the identification and
discussion of those events in the initial USITC Report were not made within the context of an
explanation of whether they constituted unforeseen developments and whether they resulted in
increased imports causing injury: i.e. no logically coherent explanation was made to establish
the link between the unforeseen developments and the increase in imports.70

The Panel also considered that the Secondary Supplementary Report only states the overall
effects of the Asian and Russian financial crisis together with the strong US dollar and

65
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economy to displace steel to other markets without any specific data to support this USITC
conclusion.71

In affirming the Panel decision, the Appellate Body also emphasized the

national investigating authority’s obligation to provide reasoned conclusions with respect to
unforeseen developments and that it is not for panels to find support for such conclusions ‘by
cobbling together disjointed references scattered throughout a competent authority's report.’72

The Panel acknowledged that the USITC Report described a plausible set of unforeseen
developments that may have resulted in increased imports to the United States from various
sources, but in the Panel’s view, it failed to demonstrate that such developments actually
resulted in increased imports into the United States causing serious injury to the domestic
producers.73 On appeal, the United States argued that the Panel had failed to consider the
relevant data in other sections of the USITC Report to support the USITC's finding that
"unforeseen developments" had resulted in increased imports. The Appellate Body denied that
the Panel had such obligation as it is for the national investigating authority and not for the
Panel to provide the adequate, coherent reasoning.74

The Panel also considered that the USITC’s determination of “unforeseen developments” is
inadequate since it was not made with respect to the specific steel products at issue.75

The

consideration of the relevant steel products would have been necessary since the steel
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producers in the United States were of the view that the effect was different on different steel
products at issue.76 The Appellate Body also affirmed the Panel decision that the investigating
authority must demonstrate “unforeseen developments” with each product subject to a
safeguard measure.77

Despite the panel and the Appellate Body decision, it is not altogether clear that the
requirement of “unforeseen developments” is justified. The history of the Uruguay Round
negotiations on the safeguard rules suggests that the negotiators did not intend to include the
“unforeseen developments” clause as a legal requirement in the new safeguard disciplines by
not including it from the draft agreement while they repeated all important provisions in the
new Agreement.78 In fact, there has been an argument as to whether the old safeguard rules
under Article XIX are still applicable even after the settlement of the Agreement on
Safeguards at all.79

The ambiguous nature of the “unforeseen developments” clause is another problem. The term
used in the original clause is “unforeseen” and not “unforeseeable”, which refers to the
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subjective, rather than objective, state of perception about the future event. The Appellate
Body, having acknowledged this subjectivity, made a distinction between “unforeseen” and
“unforeseeable”.80 Nonetheless, the Panel in U.S. Steel Safeguards considered that the standard
is not what the specific negotiators at trade concessions had in mind, rather what they could
have reasonably expected,81 which seems to blur the earlier distinction made by the Appellate
Body between “unforeseen” and “unforeseeable”. It is doubtful that there can be any clear
standard to determine “unforeseen developments”, without deviating from the language in the
provision, which indicates the subjective understanding of the event.82 Certain provisions in
the SA also seem drafted on the presumption the SA is the sole articulation of the international
rules on safeguards.83 The controversies surrounding the requirement of “unforeseen
developments” under old Article XIX would seem to continue beyond U.S. Steel Safeguards.

2.

Increase in Imports

Safeguard measures are predicated on increased imports. Emergency import restraints such as
safeguards would be difficult to justify without a significant increase in imports. Article 2.1 of
the SA provides in the relevant part, “A Member may apply a safeguard measure to a product
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only if that Member has determined that such product is being imported into its territory in
such increased quantities, absolute or relative to domestic production, and under such
conditions as to cause or threaten to cause serious injury to the domestic industry that produces
like or directly competitive products.” (Emphasis added.) The increase in imports is also a
part of the injury test discussed below. “The rate and amount of the increase in imports of the
product concerned in absolute and relative terms” is one of the eight factors to consider for the
injury determination under Article 4.2(a) of the SA.

U.S. Steel Safeguards were controversial because, inter alia, there was a significant dispute as
to the existence of such increase in steel imports. The general steel import statistics seemed to
show decreasing, rather than increasing import trends toward the end of the investigating
period. For instance, according to the U.S. Census Bureau, U.S. imports of steel products
decreased substantially from 34,433,707 metric tons in 2000 to 27,350,808 metric tons in
2001.84 Of course, this is aggregated statistics of all steel products, and the increase in imports
needs to be considered with respect to each specific product subject to the safeguard. The
Panel reviewed the U.S. determination on the increased imports with respect to the steel
products subject to U.S. Steel Safeguards.

With respect to the increased imports, the Panel considered that the increase must indicate “a
certain degree of recentness, suddenness, sharpness and significance”, following the previous

84

U.S. Census Bureau, U.S. Imports for Consumption of Steel Products, Exhibit 1 “All Steel
Products” (released February 21, 2002).

23

Appellate Body decision in Argentina - Footwear.85 Nonetheless, the Panel, in agreement with
the Panel’s view in United States – Line Pipe, also considered that the increase in imports need
not continue up to the period immediately preceding the investigating authority's
determination, nor up to the very end of the period of investigation, although the increase still
has to be “recent”.86 The Panel considered that the question as to whether a decrease in
imports at the end of the period of investigation prevents a finding of increased imports would
depend on the duration and the degree of the decrease at the end of the relevant period of
investigation, as well as the nature of the increase that intervened beforehand reflected by, for
instance, its sharpness and the extent.87 The Panel also found that the national investigating
authority is not obligated to consider the data made available after its determination of
increased imports.88

The Panel in U.S. Steel Safeguards made measure-by- measure assessments on the USITC
determinations with respect to each specific product. Regarding certain carbon flat-rolled steel
(CCRFS), hot-rolled bar, and stainless steel rod, the Panel found that the USITC failed to
provide an adequate and reasoned explanation of how the facts supported its determination of
increased imports under Article 2.1.

The decreasing import trends toward the end of

investigation period, particularly the significant drop in the interim 2001 were noted, and the
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claimed increases in imports during the investigation period were not considered recent
enough.89 The Appellate Body, emphasizing the national investigating authority’s
responsibility to examine import trends, agreed with the Panel findings with respect to those
products.90

On the other hand, the Panel found that the USITC provided an adequate and reasoned
explanation of increased imports with respect to cold-finished bar, rebar, welded pipe, fittings,
flanges and tool joints (FFTJ) and stainless steel bar where there were significant increases in
imports in the recent past from the determination as supported by the overall trends (e.g. sharp
increases followed by relatively insignificant drops).91

The Panel emphasized that the

fulfillment of the requirement of increased imports under Article 2.1 does not mean that such
increases are sufficient to cause serious injury to a domestic industry. The Panel considered
that this question should be considered in the context of causation under Article 4.2(b) as
discussed below.92

With respect to tin mill products and stainless steel wire, the Panel noted that the USITC
Commissioners made divergent findings that are, in the view of the Panel, impossible to
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reconcile given that they were based on differently defined products.93 (Some Commissioners
considered that those products should be included together in a larger category of products and
the others considered them separate products.
determinations.)

They were also divergent on injury

The Panel considered that a Member is not allowed to base under Articles

2.1 and 3.1 of the Agreement on Safeguards a safeguard measure “on a determination
supported by a set of explanations each of which is different and impossible to reconcile with
the other.”94 Here, the Appellate Body disagreed with the Panel and reversed its decision,
concluding that the affirmative findings based on different product groupings are not
necessarily mutually exclusive.95 The Appellate Body was of the view that nothing in the SA
prevents the national investigating authority from setting out multiple findings to support its
determination and that it is the Panel’s obligation to consider each of them to assess if any one
of them provides a reasoned and adequate explanation of its final determination.96

This Appellate Body decision raises certain doubt as to the proper assessment of the national
authority’s determination of increased imports in the presence of divergent opinions within
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Id., para. 10.194. The Panel further explained, “For the purposes of the Agreement on
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them. The Appellate Body stated, “the Panel should have continued its enquiry by examining
the views of the three Commissioners separately, in order to ascertain whether one of these
sets of findings contained a reasoned and adequate explanation for the USITC's "single
institutional determination" on tin mill products.”97 (Emphasis added.) Does this mean that the
Panel should conclude that the investigating authority has provided a reasoned conclusion even
if the multiple explanations offered for the same determination could not be reconciled and
only one of them is found adequate and reasonable to support the determination? If so, is this
position consistent with the relevant requirement under the SA?

Article 3.1 provides in the relevant part, “The competent authorities shall publish a report
setting forth their findings and reasoned conclusions reached on all pertinent issues of fact
and law.”

(Emphasis added.)

How can such reasoned conclusions be made if the

explanations offered for the “single institutional determination”98 cannot be reconciled with
one another? The Appellate Body considered that the relevant provisions in the SA may not
necessarily prevent presentation of multiple explanations on the part of the national authorities.
Nevertheless, what is subject to the Panel assessment is the adequacy of the explanations
offered by the national investigating authority to support its own determination and not that of
each explanation by the individual members of these authorities.

97
98

Id. para. 416.
Id.
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Then, how can the national investigating authority be considered having offered an adequate
and reasonable explanation if it presented multiple explanations that cannot be reconciled with
each other?

Should it be the Panel’s responsibility to find for the national investigating

authority an explanation that is adequate and reasonable among many that are not even
reconciled with each other or is it within the national investigating authority’s responsibility
under Article 3.1 to present coherent explanations to support its own decision after internally
reconciling whatever disagreements that the members within the authority may have? The
further judicial clarification would seem necessary on this point.

3.

Parallelism

One of the most important policy decisions made in the settlement of the SA is the elimination
of discriminatory and arbitrary import restrictions.99 One of the hardest questions during the
Uruguay Round negotiations with respect to safeguards was whether a Member should be
allowed to apply a safeguard measure selectively, according to the origin of the imported
product.100

After long negotiations, the participants finally agreed to apply safeguards

regardless of the source of imports to prevent arbitrary discriminations. Article 2.2 of the SA
provides, “Safeguard measures shall be applied to a product being imported irrespective of its
source.” (Emphasis added.)

This provision affirms the MFN application of safeguard

99
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measures and does not in principle allow Members to discriminate among exporters in
applying safeguards.

On the other hand, a Member may well wish to exclude the imports from another Member that
it has a free trade agreement (“FTA”) with. In accordance with its own free trade agreements,
the United States exempted steel imports from Canada, Mexico, Israel and Jordan from its
application of the Steel Safeguards.101 Prior to U.S. Steel Safeguards, The WTO panels and
the Appellate Body had already made it clear that the MFN requirement of Article 2 does not
allow a Member to consider injury based on imports from all sources and then exempt the
imports from some countries from the scope of its safeguard measure.102 By this requirement,
the parallelism between the scope of injury assessment and the scope of the application of the
safeguard is imposed. The Appellate Body ruled that any gap between the scope of injury
assessment and the scope of safeguard measure is justified only if the Member establishes
explicitly that imports from sources covered by the measure satisfy the conditions for the
application of a safeguard measure, as set out in Article 2.1 and elaborated in Article 4.2 of the
Agreement on Safeguards.103
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Therefore, the exemption in U.S. Steel Safeguards would be inconsistent with the requirement
of parallelism under Article 2.2 unless the United States made a positive injury determination
based solely on the imports from the other countries that were not exempted from its
safeguards. The Panel also found that when the determination and the eventual measure do not
correspond in terms of the scope, Members can (and must) establish explicitly that imports
from sources covered satisfy the conditions for safeguard action.104 The United States
contended that the USITC's analysis in the Second Supplementary Report, read in conjunction
with the initial USITC Report, satisfies the requirement of parallelism.105

There was a debate as to what amounts to a finding that establishes explicitly that imports from
sources covered by the measure satisfy the conditions for a safeguard measure.106 The United
States indicated that the competent authorities' formal conclusion as to whether non-FTA
imports have caused serious injury is sufficient and not an “explicit” recitation of the results of
each step of the analytical process leading to that conclusion.107 The Panel disagreed and
considered that the competent authorities must provide a reasoned and adequate explanation of
how the facts support their determination that the products covered in the measure alone have
caused serious injury to the domestic industry.108
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The Panel made measure-by- measure assessments to determine whether the United States
fulfilled the requirement of parallelism. With respect to all product categories, the Panel found
that the United States failed to establish explicitly that imports from the sources included in the
application of these measures fulfilled the conditions for the application of a safeguard
measure. In fact, the United States did not take the required analytical steps under the SA to
establish that the imports not exempted from the safeguards alone have caused injury to the
domestic industry. A few paragraphs in the Second Supplementary Report commenting on the
effect of the exclusion were considered insufficient and rather conclusory, lacking adequate
reasoning and explanations.109 The Panel considered in particular that the causal effects of
excluded imports were not adequately addressed under Article 4.2(b) of the SA.110

109

With respect to CCFRS, the Panel noted analytical flaws with the USITC report. First, the
causal effects of the excluded products were not adequately considered. Second, the USITC
discussion of “non-NAFTA imports” still included the imports from Israel and Jordan, which
were excluded from the Steel Safeguards and therefore should have been excluded along with
NAFTA imports in the USITC analysis. Id., paras 10.601 – 10.609. The Panel made the same
conclusions with respect to the other eight product categories. Id., paras 10.623, 10.633,
10.643, 10.653, 10.660, 10.670, 10.680, 10.692. The split of opinions among the USITC
Commissioners with respect to tin mill products and stainless steel wire were also noted. The
Panel did not make the causation analysis on stainless steel rod, but the Panel also concluded
that the USITC’s implicit and cursory determination did not amount to the reasoned and
adequate explanation required under Articles 2 and 4 of the SA. Id., para 10.699.
110
Article 4.2(b) of the SA provides, “The determination referred to in subparagraph (a)
(injury determination) shall not be made unless the investigation demonstrates, on the basis of
objective evidence, the existence of the causal link between increased imports of the product
concerned and serious injury or threat thereof. When factors other than increased imports are
causing injury to the domestic industry at the same time, such injury shall not be attributed to
increased imports.” (Explanation added.) The issue of causation will be discussed further
infra.
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On appeal, the United States argued that nothing in the SA requires a distinct or explicit
analysis of imports from sources not subject to the measure.111 The Appellate Body affirmed
the Panel position, stating that the imports excluded from the application of the safeguard
measure must be considered a factor "other than increased imports" within the meaning of
Article 4.2(b).112 The Appellate Body found that the possible injurious effects that these
excluded imports may have on the domestic industry must not be attributed to imports
included in the safeguard measure pursuant to Article 4.2(b).113 The Appellate Body was also
of the view that the Member must make a single joint determination, rather than making
separate and partial determinations, of the injurious impact of the imports included in the
measure by excluding imports from all countries that have been excluded from the safeguards,
although imports from some of those countries are very small and almost non-existent.114

This Panel and Appellate Body decisions on the requirement parallelism imposes considerable
analytical steps on a Member applying a safeguard measure with the exclusion of imports from
some of its trading partners. For instance, the United States has a treaty obligation to exempt
under certain conditions the imports from its trading partners from its safeguard measures that
it has a free trading agreement with.115 It appears from the relevant Panel and the Appellate
Body decisions that a Member may in fact exempt imports from certain countries from the
safeguard measure as long as the requirement of the parallelism is met, as discussed above.
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This raises an interesting question with respect to the MFN application of a safeguard measure
as follows. No panel and the Appellate Body decisions required the existence of free trading
agreement or any other condition in addition to the parallelism as the prerequisite for the
product exclusions. Then, would a Member be allowed to target imports from a small number
of counties, even without the presence of a FTA with them, as long as the Member explicitly
establishes that the imports from those countries alone cause or threaten to cause serious injury
to the domestic industry? If so, would it not undermine the principle of the MFN application
of safeguards? It is still arguable that this “selective application” of a safeguard measure is
different from the arbitrary and discriminatory application of gray-area measures in the past
since the Member will still have to satisfy the injury and causation requirements under the SA.

On the other hand, the Panel in Line Pipe considered that the authorization of a free trading
area under GATT Article XXIV is the legal ground for such exclusion, indicating that the
exclusion is permissible among Members with a FTA with one another.116 The Appellate
Body avoided making any ruling on this issue by stating that it did not want to “prejudge”
Article XXIV issue.117 Nevertheless, if the previous Article XXIV analysis by this Panel
would be ultimately correct, the exclusion of imports from a country without the existence of a
free trading agreement with it can be considered violating the parallelism requirement under
Article 2.2 because it will not have the Article XXIV justification limited to the members of

116
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United States – Line Pipe, Report of the Panel, supra note 43, paras 7.135 – 7.163.
United States – Line Pipe, Report of the Appellate Body, supra note 43, para. 198.
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free trade areas. In fact, permitting selective applications of a safeguard measure against
imports from one or a small number of countries without any justifying apparatus such as a
FTA would seem to undermine the agreement on the MFN safeguards application that was
finally reached after decades of treacherous debates and negotiations.118

4.

Injury Assessment

a.

Consideration of injury factors

A safeguard measure is predicated on the existence / threat of serious injury to the domestic
industry caused by increase in imports.119 The injury determination is not a precise science and
cannot avoid certain degree of subjectivity altogether.

Nonetheless, clear guidelines and

criteria for the injury determination can reduce arbitrariness in the injury determination. The
Agreement on Safeguards attempts to provide such criteria for the injury determination.
Article 4.2(a) of the SA provides,
“In the investigation to determine whether increased imports have caused or are
threatening to cause serious injury to a domestic industry under the terms of this
Agreement, the competent authorities shall evaluate all relevant factors of an objective
and quantifiable nature having a bearing on the situation of that industry, in particular,
the rate and amount of the increase in imports of the product concerned in absolute and
relative terms, the share of the domestic market taken by increased imports, changes in
the level of sales, production, productivity, capacity utilization, profits and losses, and
employment.” (Emphasis added.)

Unlike its predecessor, Article XIX, the SA specifies eight injury factors, as underlined above,
for the assessment of injury. The legal nature of those injury factors was at issue: i.e. whether
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IN

those factors were illustrated as examples that the national investigating authorities may
consider or their consideration is mandatory. The previous panels and the Appellate Body
found that the consideration of every single factor listed above is mandatory and should not be
omitted.120 These specific injury factors were modelled after the U.S. legislation121 although
they are not identical to those included in the U.S. legislation.

In U.S. Steel Safeguards, some of the injury factors specified in Article 4.2(b) were omitted
from the consideration of the USITC. For instance, the changes in productivity were not
analysed in the USITC investigation report.122 The analysis of productivity would have been
relevant in this case, as the decrease in the employment in the steel sector was widely argued
as indicative of injury to the U.S. steel industry.123

If, however, this alleged decrease in

employment was correlated with any increase in productivity: i.e. if an improvement in laborsaving production technology actually caused the decrease in employment, the decrease in
employment may have to be considered in a different light.

It is not to argue here conclusively that the decrease in employment was in fact caused by the
improvement of technology. Rather, the point is that any change in productivity should have
been analysed as it may have affected the injury determination. Curiously, the complainants
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did not raise this issue in the panel and the Appellate Body proceedings. If they had, it would
have been likely that the omission of the injury factor specified in Article 4.2(a) was
considered violation of Article 4, as such omissions were considered violation by the previous
panels and the Appellate Body.124

Unlike in Article 4.2(a), productivity is not found in the U.S. legislation among the listed
factors with respect to serious injury.125 This absence perhaps explains why the USITC did not
analyze productivity. The injury factors need not be identical between the national legislation
and the SA to achieve conformity with the WTO requirement. For instance, the safeguard
provisions of the EC include more injury factors than those of the SA.126 Raising the bar for
the safeguard applications by requiring more than is prescribed in the SA, as has been done for
the EC rules, does not render safeguard measures, that have been applied in pursuant to the
domestic rules, incompatible with the WTO requirements. The opposite, however, may lead to
the failure of compliance with the SA. Nothing in the U.S. legislation prohibits the USITC
from considering more injury factors than what is specified there. Therefore, the USITC could
have considered all the factors specifically listed under Article 4.2(a), regardless of their
presence in the U.S. legislation.

b.

Causation
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On the other hand, productivity is included with respect to a threat of serious injury. See
supra note 121.
126
European Union Council Regulation No. 3285/94, art. 10.
125

36

The application of a safeguard measure will be hardly justifiable unless the injury to the
domestic industry is in fact caused by the increase in imports. The SA also requires a Member
applying a safeguard measure to establish a causal link between the injury and the increase in
imports. Article 4.2(b) of the SA provides,
“The determination referred to in subparagraph (a) (injury determination) shall not be
made unless this investigation demonstrates, on the basis of objective evidence, the
existence of the causal link between increased imports of the product concerned and
serious injury or threat thereof. When factors other than increased imports are causing
injury to the domestic industry at the same time, such injury shall not be attributed to
increased imports.”(Explanations added.)

The previous panels and the Appellate Body have provided interpretive guides to this
provision requiring causation. The Panel in Argentina – Footwear prescribed a three-pronged
test for the determination of causation.127 The first prong of the test requires the coincidence
between an upward trend in imports and downward trends in the injury factors. If no such
coincidence is found, there must be a reasoned explanation as to why the data nevertheless
show causation. The second is whether the conditions of competition in the domestic market
between imported and domestic products demonstrate a causal link between the imports and
any injury on the basis of objective evidence. Lastly, the Panel shall assess whether other
relevant factors have been analyzed and whether it is established that any injury caused by
factors other than the imports has not been attributed to the imports (non-attribution
requirement). With regard to the sufficiency of causation, the Appellate Body also ruled that it
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is enough to establish the required causal link if the increase in imports made a sufficiently
clear contribution to the injury although the increase in imports alone could have not caused
the injury.128

The Panel in U.S. Steel Safeguards found that this causation requirement was not met with
respect to all product categories except one.129 The Panel considered that the USITC failed to
establish the coincidence between the increasing trends in imports and decreasing trends in the
injury factors and also failed to provide any other compelling argument as to why the causal
link nevertheless existed.130

The USITC’s analysis of competition between imports and

domestic products was not adequate, and it also failed to properly separate and assess the
nature and extent of the injurious effects of factors other than increased imports by improperly
dismissing a number of factors (i.e., declining domestic demand, domestic capacity increases,
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intra-industry competition and legacy costs) in its non-attribution analysis although it
acknowledged that those factors were causing injury to the industry.131

For tin mill products and stainless steel wire, the Panel noted that there were conflicting
opinions among the USITC Commissioners as to the existence of the requisite causation based
on the different product definitions.132 The Panel found that “a Member is not permitted to
base its safeguard measures on an explanation that consists of alternative explanations which,
given the different products upon which such explanations are based, cannot be reconciled as a
matter of substance.”133 Here, the Appellate Body, without deciding whether the USITC’s
explanation of the causation was adequate, ruled that the Panel’s dismissal of the USITC’s
analysis based on the Commissioners’ divergent opinions was not justifiable, applying the
same reasoning that it did in the discussion of the increased imports with respect to those two
product categories.134

5.

Notification and Consultation

As safeguard measures are applicable unilaterally without any existence of unfair practice on
the part of exporters135, their application will inevitably upset the balance of concessions
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between the exporting and importing Members.

Therefore, from the standpoint of the

exporting Members, the investigation and the application of safeguard measures need to be
promptly notified so that the exporting Members are made aware of the progress of these
measures which may significantly affect their export interests. Article 12 of the SA requires
Members to notify the WTO Committee on Safeguards at the various stages of a safeguard
investigation: at the initiation of the investigation (Article 12.1(a)); upon the finding of serious
injury or threat thereof (Article 12.1(b)); and finally, upon the decision to apply or extend a
safeguard measure (Article 12.1(c)). Article 12.1 also requires that the required notifications
must be made immediately after the relevant decisions.

With respect to the timing of notifications, the previous panel considered that Article 12.1(c)
notification must be made well before the implementation of the measure since the notification
should provide the exporting Members with the sufficient time to prepare and enter into
consultations with the Member applying the safeguard measure prior to its application.136
Article 12.3 provides,
“A Member proposing to apply or extend a safeguard measure shall provide adequate
opportunity for prior consultations with those Members having a substantial interest as
exporters of the product concerned, with a view to, inter alia, reviewing the information
under paragraph 2, exchanging views on the measure and reaching an understanding
on ways to achieve the objective set out in paragraph 1 of Article 8.”
The consultation is an essential part of the procedural requirement of safeguards.
Consultations enable the importing and exporting Members to exchange views on the proposed
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measure for the prospective of reaching a mutually satisfactory settlement and maintain the
balance of concessions.

The timing of consultation is important to achieve those ends.

Members proposing to apply a safeguard measure will need to hold those consultations well
before the implementation of a safeguard measure so that the results of those consultations can
be considered and incorporated in the final implementation of safeguards. Members are not
required to modify or withdraw their measures following the consultations, but the adequate
effort to accommodate the interests and concerns of the Members affected by the safeguards
would minimize the potential for disputes and retaliations.137

The adequacy of consultations was at issue in the previous safeguard cases. In Line Pipe, the
Appellate Body held that the United States did not provide an adequate opportunity for
consultations where the measures applied after the consultations were substantially different
from those that had been informed at the consultations.138 The United States argued that the
complaining party would have been able to request new consultations after the announcement
of the final measure, but the Appellate Body considered that the period of 18 days between the
announcement of the final U.S. measure and its implementation was not considered sufficient
for entering into new consultations.139
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In U.S. Steel Safeguards, the United States implemented the measures only 15 days after its
announcement of the measures.140 This time period is even less than the one (18 days) in Line
Pipe above, which was subsequently considered inadequately short by the Appellate Body.141
Surprisingly, this issue was not brought up by the complainants in the panel proceedings. Had
they have done so, this inadequately short time between the announcement and the
implementation would have been likely considered a violation of Article 12. In fact, the lack
of the genuine effort to provide an adequate consultation opportunity and to reach a mutually
agreeable settlement contributed to the rapid escalation of crisis in U.S. Steel Safeguards, as
manifested by the several retaliation proposals from the exporting Members.

IV.

CONCLUSION – TEST OF MULTILATERALISM IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE

Safeguard measures are widely considered the most protective of all trade measures due to
their unilateral applicability without the requirement of any unfair trade practice on the part of
the exporters. Safeguard measures will inevitably upset the balance of concessions reached
among Members during the previous trade negotiations. For this reason, safeguard measures
are prone to invite disputes and potential retaliations, particularly where the legal justifications
under the relevant WTO rules are weak and where adequate efforts to reach a satisfactory
settlement between the exporting and importing Members are not made.

To minimize the

danger of this potentially very abusive measure, the multilateral framework is in place,
including the prior consultation requirements.
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Did this multilateral framework indeed work in U.S. Steel Safeguards?

It did not seem

initially. There was serious doubt as to whether the United States had complied with the
requirements of the SA. As discussed above, the United States applied a series of safeguard
measures to a wide range of steel products where it was not even clear that the basic premises
for the application of a safeguard measure, such as the increase in imports and the causation
between the injury and imports, existed at all. It was widely believed that the political needs,
rather than the economic necessities backed by the legal justifications, prompted the
application of the Steel Safeguards.142

Political motivations do not necessarily make

safeguards incompatible with the requirements of the SA and Article XIX, but the lack of
essential legal conditions do.

The subsequent crisis in U.S. Steel Safeguards, which brought out the danger of a worldwide
trade war, began with the rushed manner of the U.S. government into the rapid application of
the Steel Safeguards without providing adequate consultation opportunities.143 It suggested
that the U.S. government did not seriously contemplate the need of those consultations under
Article 12 of the SA and the possible consequences of neglecting them. Such rush and neglect
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may have been caused by internal political pressure144, but they came too high a price, such as
the strong worldwide condemnations against the U.S. measures, which undermined its
credibility as a global leader of free trade, filing of complaints at the WTO by more nations
than in any other dispute in the GATT/WTO history as well as proposal of several retaliations
by major economies around the world.145

As the dispute progressed, the multilateral framework in place within the world trading system
was brought to function and eventually averted this crisis. The retaliation proposals by the
exporting Members were made in accordance with the relevant SA provisions, and the
exporting Members refrained themselves from applying retaliations until the resolution of
another important multilateral device of dispute settlements, the WTO panel and the Appellate
Body proceedings.146 Facing several retaliation proposals, the United States also entered into
consultations with some exporting Members and agreed to reduce steel products from its
safeguard list.147 The multilateral framework was finally shown operational and resolved this
dispute when the United States accepted the WTO DSB decision, although it ruled against all
of its measures, and withdrew them subsequently despite significant internal political pressure
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against it.148

The respect for the multilateral framework of international trade was restored

and the multilateralism endured a difficult test, which could have escalated to a worldwide
trade war.

The development of U.S. Steel Safeguards has demonstrated how important it is for Members
to adhere to the multilateral framework of the international trading system including due
compliance with the WTO legal requirements.

The initial neglect of the multilateral

framework in U.S. Steel Safeguards brought the international community to a major trade
dispute involving virtually all major economies in the world. The U.S. effort in negotiations
subsequent to its application of safeguards helped resolving the crisis149, but such crisis may
have never been borne out in the first place had the United States considered the multilateral
framework more seriously and conducted the prior consultations under Article 12 adequately
with the notifications sufficiently in advance. The properly conducted Article 12 consultations
may have led to the same negotiation results albeit without the serious disputes in progress
under the threat of retaliations.

The improper application of safeguards without valid legal justifications may also tempt other
Members to do the same in order to protect their own export interests by applying safeguards-
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in-response, as witnessed in U.S. Steel Safeguards,150 creating a chain of worldwide
protectionism. Ironically, this will eventually return to undermine the export interests of the
Member applying the safeguard measure in the first place. Retaliations will cause more
immediate damage to the export interests of the Member applying the safeguard.151 In U.S.
Steel Safeguards, the proposed retaliations were never entered into practice as the United
States withdrew all its measures in acceptance of the WTO DSB decision.

U.S. Steel Safeguards is as a notable example of politically motivated trade measures applied
initially without clear legal justifications under the relevant WTO rules and without due regard
to the multilateral framework of the safeguards, which could have been led to a full scale trade
war.152 Nonetheless, the consolation may be found in that the successful resolution of this
highly publicized dispute has in fact strengthened rather than weakened the multilateral
framework of the WTO in the end. Also, U.S. Steel Safeguards has left us a clear lesson that
the failure to duly recognize and respect the multilateral framework of international trade in
the application of a trade measure, including its legal requirements, will invite costly disputes
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down the road, such as the one witnessed in this case.
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